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Dear MAJ(Retired) Agha Humayun Amin,
Thank you so much for your letter and your interest in leadership and character development. I have sent your work to our military leadership department (The Department of Behavioral Science & Leadership) for their dissemination and review. West Point prides itself as being the premier leadership institution in the U.S., and we constantly strive to produce "leaders of character" for our nation. Our Military Art class draws heavily upon the works of Clausewitz; therefore, your summary will prove interesting to our own instructors.
Thanks again for your letter, your books and your interest. I wish you the best of luck in the future
Sincerely,
7397733
Freddy. E. McFarten Brigadier General, USA
Commandant of Cadets
Research journal devoted to security issues worldwide
Owing to the thickness of the jungle we could
scarcely see or hear anything for ourselves,
but were conforming to the movements,
when suddenly the native regiment on our
left flank began to cheer and to charge, and
we followed their movements. I could see
little of the enemy, except a party of cavalry
in red jackets, who at the time I suppose
Owing to the thickness of the jungle we could
scarcely see or hear anything for ourselves,
but were conforming to the movements,
when suddenly the native regiment on our
left flank began to cheer and to charge, and
we followed their movements. I could see
little of the enemy, except a party of cavalry
in red jackets, who at the time I supposed
to be our own Irregular Cavalry, for they were proceeding in the same direction as ourselves. By some unaccountable circumstance there was a check in our line from the left; the men began to retire, and my two squadrons finding this, without a word from me also went about. In the excessive
dust and jungle the men soon got confused and mixed up with other regiments, and notwithstanding all my efforts, it was impossible for some time to rally them. The enemy's cavalry now came about us in great numbers, and fastened like hornets upon any poor fellow they could pick out, waiting for their opportunity behind trees and bushes, whereby many of our men became an easy prey to an enemy expert in the use of the sword. Keep our men in a body, and nothing can beat them; but if they be separated in a jungle, with an enemy three times their number, and used to this description of fighting, then they stand but a poor chance.
This was the first incident where European troops had fled
in a conventional pitched battle and this incident had no
precedent.
Luckily for the British the rebellion of 1857 destroyed the
British company which was taken over by the British crown
and this great blunder was conveniently white washed and
forgotten.
All British failures were ascrib
This was the first incident where European troops had fled
in a conventional pitched battle and this incident had no
precedent.
Luckily for the British the rebellion of 1857 destroyed the
British company which was taken over by the British crown
and this great blunder was conveniently white washed and
forgotten.
All British failures were ascribed to the british company and
this malpractise continues to this day with highly naive and
poor intellectual caliber characters like Dalrymple and
Tharoor !
Much water has since the shameful flight of Popes brigade
flown under
to write history as it happened staying above narrow nationalistic , ideological or political biases and bugs
Research historical matters dispassionately and with sole loyalty to the cause of truth and objectivity.
We offer research services , cartographic services , book location services.
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Colonel Kuldeep Singh most graciously shares General V.P Malik CONVINCINGLY REBUTTED BY Brigadier Surinder Singh
*REPLY OF BRIGADIER SURINDER SINGH, SM, VSM TO GEN V P MALIK*
1. General Malik in a TV interview has mentioned that Kargil war was an intelligence and surveillance failure. This statement is absolutely devoid of truth and factu
Colonel Kuldeep Singh most graciously shares General V.P Malik CONVINCINGLY REBUTTED BY Brigadier Surinder Singh
*REPLY OF BRIGADIER SURINDER SINGH, SM, VSM TO GEN V P MALIK*
1. General Malik in a TV interview has mentioned that Kargil war was an intelligence and surveillance failure. This statement is absolutely devoid of truth and factually incorrect.
2. I briefed Gen Malik on 28 August 1998, 10 months before the war about the Enhanced Thread Perception giving the following details:-
(a) Three additional Infantry Battalions of Pakistan had arrived opposite Kargil; one as summer poster, second, 24 SINDH which was Pakistan FCNA's Divisional reserve has move to Olthingthang, one more battalian has moved on priority from Sialkot location of which was not known.
(b) 25 heavy and 5 medium guns inducted into sector.
(c) M-198, 155 mm Howitzers inducted at K2 Position opposite my sector and being manned by Chinese personnel.
(d) M-11 missile reached Deosai plains.(Nuclear Capable)
(e) Light flashes resembling shooting stars/laser beams seen over Dras, Brigade Headquarters, Advance Landing Ground/ ALG, Air Field, Field Supply Depot. These Were Likely laser designators of smart weapons / missiles.
3. Anti National elements threat.
(a) Infiltration routes available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to Panighar, Yaldor, and through Nallas in Forward Defence Localities.
Additional Weapons required.
(a) Bofors Regiment.
(b) Heavy Motors 160 mm
(c) 50 Konkurs missiles (d) Four L70 and six Zu- 23 guns.
(e) One Air OP flight at Kargil .
(f)One flight of RPV ( Remotely Piloted airborne Vehicle).
(g) WEU Sub Group (Wireless Experimental Units), EW detachment deployed. ( to intercept and decode enemy communications)
(h) Seven gun/ mortar locating radars.
(i) Three TMM-3 bridges as Reserves.
(j) Air photos.
(k) Satellite imageries.
4. Gen Malik was taken to Dras and briefed about important features including the famous feature which I had named TIGER HILL which would be taken by the enemy. ( As mentioned by his staff and Division Staff I was mocked).
The GOC Gen Budhwar was again briefed who told me to wargame it and in October 98, I proved to him that the situation was serious through exercise "JANCH" and requested for Permanent Defences/ Concrete Bunkers on Tiger Hill and other important features like 5608, Talab (approach toTigerHill), Point 5318, Point 5240 ( Tololong Top), Point 5165, etc. When I kept pestering him he told me to give a presentation to him in Leh which was done on 24 Feb 99.
7. Request for permanent bunkers was also forwarded to him vide letter dated 18 Mar 99.
Details of exercise JANCH were also forwarded to him on 21 Feb 99.
Our Intelligence unit had got exact details of enemy move from Gurikot via, Kil and Safaid Nallah to Tololing and further to Dras , Pindras. One of them to move to Kaobal Gali and further to Minimarg and Sonamarg
The Civil intelligence had mentioned that is Swift oftensive cannot be ruled out.
Then the late indicator and most important intelligence input was the establishment of Pakistan medium gun positions at Buniyal just across Dras Heights which along with the other units of that Pakistan Brigade covered complete Dras and Mushkow Valley.
Never in history of Wars with Pakistan or Warfare in general have such precise and minute details been available about enemy.
11. On15 September 98, The Corps Commander moved in 79 Brigade Recce and Orders Group and wanted to thwart enemy likely plans and after the troops were ready for the actions, Gen Malik called of the operation and send the Brigade back across Zojila. They could not be brought back as snow fall blocked Zojila. This is mentioned in the Kargil Review Committee Report published as a book.
12. Surveillance. Maximun patrols including long range patrols were sent which enabled me to identify important features for occupation and construction of differences and bunker to defend the area
13. Helicopter located at Kargil were withdrawn to Leh and not made available to the Brigade commander for reconnainance. Though allowed by Brig Avation. Helicopters were directed to not fly closer than 10 km from LOC to avoid enemy and anti aircraft guns.
14. Air photos were requested but GOC 3 Div, Gen Budhwar did not sign the requisition as he was only authorised to demand them
15. Satellite images were available but not given to the brigade.
16. Classified information/ documents retained and leaked by General Malik . General Malik in reply to
my Writ Petition as respondent attached highly classified documents of M O Director to it. When under RTI Act I asked for details from Army headquarters as to weather these highly classified documents were given to General Malik, who retained them long after his retirement, they replied that these were destroyed by burning by a board of officers and forwarded a copy of board proceeding to me. General Malik needs to disclose as to how he procured, retained and did not return the documents and used them long after his retirement.
In his book, " From Surprise to Victory" in acknowledgement he mentions the details of MO Directorate officers and other commander and officer who assisted him in detail, drew sketches and provided maps to him.
Similarly in Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma's book, " Kargil Blood On The snow" it is mentioned that all help and details including briefings in MO Directorate and use of After Action Reports have been mentioned He has also mentioned that he was briefed in detail by Brigadier Devinder Singh who also facilitated his visit to other important headquarters in Leh Area.
In his book Gen Malik has mentioned exact details of Army formations moved from opposite the Chinese and brought into Kargil including 108 Brigade by denuding Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Top secret information leaked. In his book he has revealed the name of my Top Secret source( mole of 121 infantry Brigade)which was a security deletion by the Government in the Kargil Review Committee Report. This put the life of the source in danger and when this information reaches Pakistan intelligence to check their sources connected to him. Gen Malik compromised my best source of information.
Action against me. To cover his own failures and lapses ( which ultimately helped Pakistani operations) he arbitrarily, on flimsy allegations proceeded against me alleging the making of photocopies of some documents. Actually these were attached as annexures by me with the representation I submitted to him ( Gen Malik, the then COAS).
The enquiry convened on the leaking of classified information remained inconclusive for want of evidence (witness )of General Malik as he was strongly suspected to have leaked the information, and I had brought on record the conclusive evidence to that effect, in my statement before the court of inquiry.
In view of the above facts, the enquiry should be restarted afresh.
There is no professional or any genuine charge against me in fact General Budhwar the only person who was present close to me in war and who was my commander , much after my removal from command, wrote in my ACR ," Surinder is a dedicated and sincere officer. He is a humane individual. He took charge of Kargil Sector in early June 98 when the sector was operationally active with trans- LC firing taking place every day. His duties as Commander 121 Inf Bde in HAA, besides Ops and Admn, involved management of the Line of Control, keeping NH 1 A open and management of traffic on the same, prevention of infiltration into area of responsibilities. He displayed professional resolve in executing Op tasks. He followed professional advice and has Instituted measures to minimise damage to own assets in the Bde Sector due to enemy fire. On Discovery of the armed intrusion by Pakistan into unheld areas of the Brigade sector, he acted swiftly, blunted the design of the enemy by containing the intrusion and set the stage for further operations. The officer expressed his views freely and renders advice when sought. He has created a conducive working environment in his formation. He cares for the administration of troops under his command. He conducts himself with dignity in social forums. "
Then why was I removed.
Therefore the contention of Gen Malik in his book that he had no choice except to remove me after consulting my commander is a patent lie.
General Malik allegedly instructed Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Lieutenant General Vij to provide all support to writer like Captain Amrinder Singh Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma, etc ,who, I have reason to believe, were provided free access to Top Secret M O Directorate of full support.
It is pertinent to mention some action of Gen Malik which helped the Pakistan operations. He changed the Army Commanders, DGMOs, Brigade commanders Battalian commanders, frontline company commanders and my principal Operations officers, BM and GSO-3 (Intelligence) in the midst of War .
Reports of visits of Gen Musharraf and PM Nawaz Sharif and Landing at F 16 Jets were confirmed
I met men of 'C' Squadron of Poona Horse doing Road opening jobs in Srinagar. When I ask them I was told that the tanks had been greased and mothballed. This was with other units of the strike corps also which rendered them incapable of operations against Pakistan for at least 2 months . When the war commenced and the Kargil and Ammunition dump was blown by enemy action as and the only communication means of Kargil Sector with Corps Headquarter/ Srinagar, the Troposcatter was burnt Gen Malik went to Poland that too after requesting for Air Force and attack helicopter to Poland. He did not return for about 20 days and that is when I and my young officers and men were battling hard to push back the Pakistanis from the roads which they had come down to. And we pushed them back from these and opened the road axis. Also recaptured Localities. In a masterstroke I captured Point 5240 which is topmost Point above Tololing with a Bn Minus encircled the enemy.
Headquarter 70 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Devinder Singh was moved in without any Troops on 18 September 98 to take over Dras sector and kept at Nimu without any job till 23rd April 99. When they moved in with families.
The fresh enquiry should also investigate as to why two battalians 9 Mahar and 26 MLI were removed and gaps created for enemy. Also why the bridge guards right up to Leh were removed by the GOC. Next the attention of the Troops was diverted from war effort to making a zoo in Leh, catching rare animal and birds as well as preparations for a light and sound show there.
Gen Malik has left many areas in Pakistani possession, the most strategically dangerous being Point 5353 East of Tiger Hill which dominates Our NH 1 A and Dras as well as our Alternative route to Kargil.
The truth of Kargil lies buried and in Public Interest it must be investigated I must mention that these details may not have been forwarded to the Government and suppressed at some level which is quite obvious and necessitates reopening of the Kargil war enquiry afresh.
Everything mentioned in this article is available in Kargil Review Committee Report published as a book or open documents of Court, Books publishedby Gen Malik, Maj Gen Ashok Kalyan Verma, Capt Amarinder S. No classified information has been included
Colonel Kuldeep Singh most graciously shares General V.P Malik CONVINCINGLY REBUTTED BY Brigadier Surinder Singh
*REPLY OF BRIGADIER SURINDER SINGH, SM, VSM TO GEN V P MALIK*
1. General Malik in a TV interview has mentioned that Kargil war was an intelligence and surveillance failure. This statement is absolutely devoid of truth and factu
Colonel Kuldeep Singh most graciously shares General V.P Malik CONVINCINGLY REBUTTED BY Brigadier Surinder Singh
*REPLY OF BRIGADIER SURINDER SINGH, SM, VSM TO GEN V P MALIK*
1. General Malik in a TV interview has mentioned that Kargil war was an intelligence and surveillance failure. This statement is absolutely devoid of truth and factually incorrect.
2. I briefed Gen Malik on 28 August 1998, 10 months before the war about the Enhanced Thread Perception giving the following details:-
(a) Three additional Infantry Battalions of Pakistan had arrived opposite Kargil; one as summer poster, second, 24 SINDH which was Pakistan FCNA's Divisional reserve has move to Olthingthang, one more battalian has moved on priority from Sialkot location of which was not known.
(b) 25 heavy and 5 medium guns inducted into sector.
(c) M-198, 155 mm Howitzers inducted at K2 Position opposite my sector and being manned by Chinese personnel.
(d) M-11 missile reached Deosai plains.(Nuclear Capable)
(e) Light flashes resembling shooting stars/laser beams seen over Dras, Brigade Headquarters, Advance Landing Ground/ ALG, Air Field, Field Supply Depot. These Were Likely laser designators of smart weapons / missiles.
3. Anti National elements threat.
(a) Infiltration routes available through Mashkoh Valley, from Doda side to Panighar, Yaldor, and through Nallas in Forward Defence Localities.
Additional Weapons required.
(a) Bofors Regiment.
(b) Heavy Motors 160 mm
(c) 50 Konkurs missiles (d) Four L70 and six Zu- 23 guns.
(e) One Air OP flight at Kargil .
(f)One flight of RPV ( Remotely Piloted airborne Vehicle).
(g) WEU Sub Group (Wireless Experimental Units), EW detachment deployed. ( to intercept and decode enemy communications)
(h) Seven gun/ mortar locating radars.
(i) Three TMM-3 bridges as Reserves.
(j) Air photos.
(k) Satellite imageries.
4. Gen Malik was taken to Dras and briefed about important features including the famous feature which I had named TIGER HILL which would be taken by the enemy. ( As mentioned by his staff and Division Staff I was mocked).
The GOC Gen Budhwar was again briefed who told me to wargame it and in October 98, I proved to him that the situation was serious through exercise "JANCH" and requested for Permanent Defences/ Concrete Bunkers on Tiger Hill and other important features like 5608, Talab (approach toTigerHill), Point 5318, Point 5240 ( Tololong Top), Point 5165, etc. When I kept pestering him he told me to give a presentation to him in Leh which was done on 24 Feb 99.
7. Request for permanent bunkers was also forwarded to him vide letter dated 18 Mar 99.
Details of exercise JANCH were also forwarded to him on 21 Feb 99.
Our Intelligence unit had got exact details of enemy move from Gurikot via, Kil and Safaid Nallah to Tololing and further to Dras , Pindras. One of them to move to Kaobal Gali and further to Minimarg and Sonamarg
The Civil intelligence had mentioned that is Swift oftensive cannot be ruled out.
Then the late indicator and most important intelligence input was the establishment of Pakistan medium gun positions at Buniyal just across Dras Heights which along with the other units of that Pakistan Brigade covered complete Dras and Mushkow Valley.
Never in history of Wars with Pakistan or Warfare in general have such precise and minute details been available about enemy.
11. On15 September 98, The Corps Commander moved in 79 Brigade Recce and Orders Group and wanted to thwart enemy likely plans and after the troops were ready for the actions, Gen Malik called of the operation and send the Brigade back across Zojila. They could not be brought back as snow fall blocked Zojila. This is mentioned in the Kargil Review Committee Report published as a book.
12. Surveillance. Maximun patrols including long range patrols were sent which enabled me to identify important features for occupation and construction of differences and bunker to defend the area
13. Helicopter located at Kargil were withdrawn to Leh and not made available to the Brigade commander for reconnainance. Though allowed by Brig Avation. Helicopters were directed to not fly closer than 10 km from LOC to avoid enemy and anti aircraft guns.
14. Air photos were requested but GOC 3 Div, Gen Budhwar did not sign the requisition as he was only authorised to demand them
15. Satellite images were available but not given to the brigade.
16. Classified information/ documents retained and leaked by General Malik . General Malik in reply to
my Writ Petition as respondent attached highly classified documents of M O Director to it. When under RTI Act I asked for details from Army headquarters as to weather these highly classified documents were given to General Malik, who retained them long after his retirement, they replied that these were destroyed by burning by a board of officers and forwarded a copy of board proceeding to me. General Malik needs to disclose as to how he procured, retained and did not return the documents and used them long after his retirement.
In his book, " From Surprise to Victory" in acknowledgement he mentions the details of MO Directorate officers and other commander and officer who assisted him in detail, drew sketches and provided maps to him.
Similarly in Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma's book, " Kargil Blood On The snow" it is mentioned that all help and details including briefings in MO Directorate and use of After Action Reports have been mentioned He has also mentioned that he was briefed in detail by Brigadier Devinder Singh who also facilitated his visit to other important headquarters in Leh Area.
In his book Gen Malik has mentioned exact details of Army formations moved from opposite the Chinese and brought into Kargil including 108 Brigade by denuding Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
Top secret information leaked. In his book he has revealed the name of my Top Secret source( mole of 121 infantry Brigade)which was a security deletion by the Government in the Kargil Review Committee Report. This put the life of the source in danger and when this information reaches Pakistan intelligence to check their sources connected to him. Gen Malik compromised my best source of information.
Action against me. To cover his own failures and lapses ( which ultimately helped Pakistani operations) he arbitrarily, on flimsy allegations proceeded against me alleging the making of photocopies of some documents. Actually these were attached as annexures by me with the representation I submitted to him ( Gen Malik, the then COAS).
The enquiry convened on the leaking of classified information remained inconclusive for want of evidence (witness )of General Malik as he was strongly suspected to have leaked the information, and I had brought on record the conclusive evidence to that effect, in my statement before the court of inquiry.
In view of the above facts, the enquiry should be restarted afresh.
There is no professional or any genuine charge against me in fact General Budhwar the only person who was present close to me in war and who was my commander , much after my removal from command, wrote in my ACR ," Surinder is a dedicated and sincere officer. He is a humane individual. He took charge of Kargil Sector in early June 98 when the sector was operationally active with trans- LC firing taking place every day. His duties as Commander 121 Inf Bde in HAA, besides Ops and Admn, involved management of the Line of Control, keeping NH 1 A open and management of traffic on the same, prevention of infiltration into area of responsibilities. He displayed professional resolve in executing Op tasks. He followed professional advice and has Instituted measures to minimise damage to own assets in the Bde Sector due to enemy fire. On Discovery of the armed intrusion by Pakistan into unheld areas of the Brigade sector, he acted swiftly, blunted the design of the enemy by containing the intrusion and set the stage for further operations. The officer expressed his views freely and renders advice when sought. He has created a conducive working environment in his formation. He cares for the administration of troops under his command. He conducts himself with dignity in social forums. "
Then why was I removed.
Therefore the contention of Gen Malik in his book that he had no choice except to remove me after consulting my commander is a patent lie.
General Malik allegedly instructed Director General Military Operations (DGMO) Lieutenant General Vij to provide all support to writer like Captain Amrinder Singh Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma, etc ,who, I have reason to believe, were provided free access to Top Secret M O Directorate of full support.
It is pertinent to mention some action of Gen Malik which helped the Pakistan operations. He changed the Army Commanders, DGMOs, Brigade commanders Battalian commanders, frontline company commanders and my principal Operations officers, BM and GSO-3 (Intelligence) in the midst of War .
Reports of visits of Gen Musharraf and PM Nawaz Sharif and Landing at F 16 Jets were confirmed
I met men of 'C' Squadron of Poona Horse doing Road opening jobs in Srinagar. When I ask them I was told that the tanks had been greased and mothballed. This was with other units of the strike corps also which rendered them incapable of operations against Pakistan for at least 2 months . When the war commenced and the Kargil and Ammunition dump was blown by enemy action as and the only communication means of Kargil Sector with Corps Headquarter/ Srinagar, the Troposcatter was burnt Gen Malik went to Poland that too after requesting for Air Force and attack helicopter to Poland. He did not return for about 20 days and that is when I and my young officers and men were battling hard to push back the Pakistanis from the roads which they had come down to. And we pushed them back from these and opened the road axis. Also recaptured Localities. In a masterstroke I captured Point 5240 which is topmost Point above Tololing with a Bn Minus encircled the enemy.
Headquarter 70 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Devinder Singh was moved in without any Troops on 18 September 98 to take over Dras sector and kept at Nimu without any job till 23rd April 99. When they moved in with families.
The fresh enquiry should also investigate as to why two battalians 9 Mahar and 26 MLI were removed and gaps created for enemy. Also why the bridge guards right up to Leh were removed by the GOC. Next the attention of the Troops was diverted from war effort to making a zoo in Leh, catching rare animal and birds as well as preparations for a light and sound show there.
Gen Malik has left many areas in Pakistani possession, the most strategically dangerous being Point 5353 East of Tiger Hill which dominates Our NH 1 A and Dras as well as our Alternative route to Kargil.
The truth of Kargil lies buried and in Public Interest it must be investigated I must mention that these details may not have been forwarded to the Government and suppressed at some level which is quite obvious and necessitates reopening of the Kargil war enquiry afresh.
Everything mentioned in this article is available in Kargil Review Committee Report published as a book or open documents of Court, Books publishedby Gen Malik, Maj Gen Ashok Kalyan Verma, Capt Amarinder S. No classified information has been included
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